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780 PEOPLE v. LINDLEY [260.20 
[Crim. No. 4614. In Bank. July 30, 1945.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MARVIN 
LINDLEY, Appellant. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Trial-Proceedings After Recovery of Sanity. 
-The certificate of the superintendent of a state hospital for 
the insane, upon the release of a person for trial on a criminal 
charge, need not, under Pen. Code, § 1372, be in any particular 
form, and if the sheriff and the district attorney received a 
.notiee from the hospital that defendant is Dot insane and the 
judge remarked at the commencement of the trial that defend-
ant was returned to ~urt "as sane," the presumption, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, is that the duties of the 
superintendent and other ofticials were property performed, 
and that defendant was duly discharged and was brought into 
eourt in the manner prescribed by statute. 
[2] Id.-'1'rial-Doubt of Sanity as Basis for TriaJ.-Tbe "doubt" 
as to the sanity of a defendant, requiring a trial of sllch issue 
under Pen. Code, § 1368, is one that must arise in the mind of 
the trial judge, rather than in the mind ot counsel for the 
defendant· or in that of any third person. 
[8] Id.-TriaJ-Insanity Bequiring Trial-DiscretioD of Oourt.-
A determination of a motion for a hearing on the issue of a 
defendant's sanity at the time of trial is one which rests within 
the sound discretion of the court, and its denial of the motion 
will not be disturbed on appeal where there is no abuse of dis-
cretion. 
[4] Homicide-Evidenee-Suffi:ciency.-A conviction of murder of 
a 13-year-old girl was sustained by testimony indicating that 
defendant had ample opportunity to attack the girl and leave 
her unconscious at the place where she was found in response 
to her cries; that he was the only person who fitted the de-
scription of the person who had been seen at that plMe shortly 
prior W thE' ofTpn!lr:that he was the person whom the girl 
[1] See 8 OaLJur. 199. 
[3] Investigation of present sanity to determine whether accused 
should be put, or continue, on trial, note, 142 A.L.R. 961. See, also, 
8 Oal.Jur. 195; 4 OalJur. IO-Yr. Supp. (1943 rev.), 721. 
Mclt. Dig. Beferences: [1] Criminal Law, § 236(8); [2] Crimi- I 
Dal Law, § 236(2); [3] Criminal Law, § 236(4); [4] HomicidE', 
§ 145; [5] Homicide, § 15(6); [6] Homicide, § 249; [7) Criminal 
Law, § 1315; [8] Homicide, § 145(3); [9] Rape, § 4; [10] Homi-· 
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referred to as "the redheaded man" who attacked her; and 
that he was identified as the man whOm a boy saw "fighting" 
with the girl. 
[6] Id.-Murder in First Degree.-Where a murder is committed 
in perpetration or attempted perpetration of any. of the fel-
onies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189, the offender is guilty of 
m nrder of the first degree by the mere force of the statute. 
[6] Id.-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-Even where the. evidence 
in a murder case does not establish conclusively that the mur-
der was committed in perpetration or attempted perpetration 
of any of the felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189, if the 
record affords substantialsupport for the conclusion that one 
of the enumerated felonies was perpetrated or attempted, and 
the killing was committed in such perpetration or attempt, 
a conviction of murder of the first degree must be aftlrmed. 
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-After a 
conviction all intendments are in favor of the judgment and 
a verdict will not be set aside unless the record clearly shows 
that on no hypothesis is there sufficient substantial evidence 
to support it. 
[8a, 8b]Homicide-Evidence-Sufiiciency.-ln a prosecution for 
murder of a lS-year-old girl, the evidence supported the con-
clusion of the jury that death resulted from injuries sustained 
either in a rape or an attempted perpetration of rape, where, 
at the time she was found in response to her cries for help, 
she was weak, choking, bruised and· close to death; her cloth-
inl!' was torn and she told those who came to her aid that she 
had been attacked by an "old red headed man," which an-
swered defendant's description; and the wounds reyealed by 
the autopsy corroborated her charge. 
[9] Ra.pe - Penetration. -In establishing rape, evidence of any 
sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the 
crime. (Pen. Code, § 263.) 
[10] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instruc-
tions.-In a prosecution for murder, any error in an instruc-
tion as to the burderi of proving circumstances of mitigation 
did not prejltdice defendant's rights where under the evidence 
the only cnme of which he could have been found guilty was 
a killing in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape. 
[11] Id. - Instructions - Punishment-Discretion of Jl11'7.-It is 
not error to instruct the jury that if they find defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree, with some utenuating facts or 
circumstances, it is within their disoretion to specify a sen-
tenoe which will relieve him from the extreme penalty, but 
that, if there are no e:rtenuating circumstances, it is their duty 
to find a simple verdict of murder in the first degree and leave 
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[12] Id.-Instructions-Degrees of Offense.-In a prosecution for 
murder, the jury was adequately informed concerning the dif-
ference between murder of the first and of the second degree 
where the trial judge in several instructions fully and correctly 
explained the essential elements of each of these offenses. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sutter County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Arthur Coats, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Desmond A. Winship for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-When he was charged with having mur-
dered a 13-year-old girl, William Marvin Lindley pleaded not 
guilty, but before the date set for trial it was brought to the 
attention of the court that a doubt had arisen concerning his 
sanity. Following a hearing upon that issue he was commit-
ted to the Mendocino State Hospital. Ten months later he 
was released to the sheriff and brought to trial upon the 
murder charge. The case is now before this court upon an 
automatic appeal from the judgment imposing the death pen-
alty which was entered upon the verdict of the jury finding 
him guilty and the order denying a new trial. 
The record discloses that on August 16, 1943, two days 
before Jackie Hamilton, the victim of the tragedy, was found 
under conditions which resulted in her death shortly after-
ward, she had arrived at Yuba City with her father and 
mother and three sisters, Willa Mae, Barbara, and Shirley, 
who were then 17, 15, and 3 years of age, respectively. The 
family established a camp at a place which was between the 
levee of the Feather River and the stream. Clumps of trees 
dotted the area and the terrain was irregular. Some 200 
yards to the northeast, built directly on the stream, was a 
boathouse inhabited by William Owens, his nine-year-old son, 
a man called Shorty, and Lindley. Owens had known Lindley 
for about five years and had always called him "Red." The 
men maintained a store in the boathouse, selling soft drinks 
and merchandise to the riders and campers who frequented 
the vicinity. 




.JUly 1945J PEOPLE t'. LINDLEY 
[26 C.2d 780; 161 P.2d 227] 
783 
but did not go to the boathouse that day. On Tuesday, Bar-
bara went down to find out where they could get water, and 
visited the boathouse several other times. The next day, a 
little boy took the three older girls, Willa Mae, Barbara and 
Jackie, across the river in a boat. On the opposite bank they 
saw a sheepherder and his fiock. When they returned Bar-
bara and Jackie went in swimming, and later Willa Mae 
joined them. 
Meanwhile Mr. Hamilton had become acquainted with the 
men at the boathouse. He agreed to drive Owens and "Red" 
to a place a few miles outside the city where they could col-
lect wages due them for peach picking. The three men left 
in the automobile shortly after noon. Some time later Bar-
bara and Jackie left the water. They went up to the boat-
house to change to dry clothing. Shorty was the only man 
there, and he told Jackie to wrap herself in a blanket and get 
her clothes from a tub in which she had placed them. She 
did so, and Barbara helped her dress in the.men's restroom. 
Jackie then said she would go back to camp. 
Willa Mae, still in the water, saw "quite a ways off," "a 
man with a brown hat and khakis. :. in the willows .... 
It looked like he was shaking a pole going back and forth. 
Shaking the willows." About this same time, which was 
probably around 2 o'clock, the three men had returned from 
town after completing their errands and making grocery pur-
chases, and within five minutes after' their arrival "Red" 
had taken some ale which they had bought and walked with 
it in the direction of the boathouSe. Owens had stayed in 
camp to visit with Mr. and Mrs. Hamilton. 
"Red" was wearing a khaki suit, a "kind of brown khaki," 
shirt and pants, and a brown hat. It was a brown hat, or 
one similar to it, that had been given to him by Owens. 
When Jackie reached the camp, 200 yards from the boat· 
house, her father, Owens, her mother and Shirley were there 
but "Red" . had left. Owens was drinking from a jug of 
wine bought in town; Mr. Hamilton had about two tablespoons 
of it. Jackie did not mention having seen "Red" on the way. 
She stayed only about five minutes and then walked back 
toward the river. During this brief interval Barbara was at 
the boathouse; Willa Mae had left the water and started back 
to ('Amp for dry clothes. The man was still in the willows 
when she left the river, 80 she took the trail to the house, 
) 
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without passing the place where he was. 'He was there when 
I got through swimming," she testified, "in the willows 
and I just went on to the house. I kind of got scared and 
went to the house." She did not recognize the man as any-
one she had seen and she had never met "Red." After reach-
ing camp she stayed there quite a while, then changed her 
clothes and took Shirley down to the boathouse. On the way 
there, she did not see or look for the man in the willows. 
Meanwhile at the boathouse "Red" had come in and joined 
Barbara and Shorty about 15 or 20 minutes after Jackie left 
for camp. He did not mention having stopped in the willows 
on the way, or having met and injured Jackie, if he did so. 
His whereabouts over the period of 15 minutes is not ac-
counted for unless he was the man in the willows. He sat 
around drinking beer and smoking one cigarette after another. 
Five or six minutes after "Red's" arrival, Willa Mae came 
in with Shirley, and about 15 or 20 minutes after that two 
boys, Richard and Lawrence, who were riding horses, stopped 
at the boathouse. The group talked for 20 or 25 minutes and 
then the two boys went to get their horses. Willa Mae. the 
baby and Barbara started to walk toward the camp. A period 
of 60 or 70 minutes had then elapsed since Jackie left the 
boathouse and paid her five-minute visit to the camp. 
The group of young people came upon Owens sitting on a 
hump of bermuda grass on the hill. He had left the camp 
after sitting around with Mr. Hamilton for an hour or an hour 
and a quarter. He said he was taking sand out of his shoe. 
That took him three or four minutes, and he then went on 
down to the boathouse and joined Shorty and "Red." Three 
or four minutes after he reached the boathouse, and while 
Barbara, Willa Mae, and the baby were watching the two 
boys mount their horses, they heard Jackie call out "help, 
I am drowning," and similar cries. Willa Mae and Barbara 
were not alarmed as Jackie had been fooling them all morn-
ing by calling for help and pretending that she was drowning. 
Willa Mae went on to camp with the baby and told her mother 
she guessed her sister had fainted. She knew Jackie had not 
been well because of successive bouts with rheumatic fever 
and its effect upon her heart, but she was "gaining and get-
ting very stout. A very healthy looking little girl." 
Barbara remarked to the boys, "She is fooling; she has 
been fooling all day like that," but the boys said they would 
CO down and see. Richard went part way on his horse and 
, 
J 
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called, "you are not going to drown in the sand." BJ.t 
Jackie had recognized Barbara's voice and said "help, Bar-
bara, help." Then Barbara· also cried out for help and 
the father went to the aid of the girls. He placed the time 
of the cry as 10 miJl.utes or less after Owens left the camp. 
It was eStimated as 3 :15 or 3 :20, or an hour and a quarter 
after the men returned from town. 
Jackie was lying outside the willows on thp. sand. ShA 
was on her side with her fllce turned partly into the hand. 
There was a little spot of blood on her cheek, dry blood in 
her nose and "great big reddish blue purple spot.'1 on her 
little throat like somebody had hold of her throat." Ac-
cording to her father's testimony, she said, "Daddy, that 
old red headed man; that dirty liar at the boathouse." Bar-
bara testified that in suggesting to her father, "Daddy, let's 
take her to the boathouse." Jackie replied. "No, that old 
man at the boathouse, he did it, the dirty liar.tlThe father 
also told the jury that she kept saying. _ "The old red 
headed man. the dirty liar, did it." 
The clothing on the child was torn in front. She had on 
only the waist and skirt in which Barbara had helped dress 
her, with no shoes, stockings or panties. The dress had not 
been torn· when she put it on after her swim. She was so weak 
and bruised she could not walk. With the help of the boys 
the automobile was brought near and she was placed in it. 
The men at the boathouse had heard Barbara scream and 
holler "Bill" (Owens). Shorty was in the house; "Red" was 
sitting in front on a box; and Owens was lying on a pad 
or mattress he had thrown on the floor. Owens jumped 
up and ran to the automobile, arriving as they were get-
ting Jackie into the car. He asked to ride to the hospital 
with them. En route they stopped at the sheriff's office for 
directions and the sheriff, in his car, cleared the road for 
them to the hospital. The little girl passed away on the 
operating table about 15 minutes after arrival. This was 
between 3 :45 and 4 :15. 
The physician who examined her testified: "When she was 
brought to the hospital she was in very poor condition. As a 
matter of fact she was breathing her last. She was quite blue 
and you might say she was shocked to death. • . • The cause 
of death was asphyxiation. . . . It can occur from a variety of 
eauses"; it could come from being choked. He said the girl 
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and the call for help came he went up to the -ear and 
made inquiry as to what had occurred. 
The judgment based upon this testimony is challenged 
upon four grounds. First, it is said, the record shows no 
evidence that Lindley had regained his sanity. The second 
point relied upon for reversal is the asserted insufficiency 
of the evidence to establish that Lindley committed the homi-
cide. As also justifying a new trial, counsel points out that 
the evidence is insufficient to establish the crime as murder 
of the first degree. Finally, complaint is made of certain 
instructions to the jury. 
[1] The contention that there is no evidence tending to 
prove Lindley's sanity at the time of the trial is based 
·upon the sheriff's failure to produce a certificate signed by 
the superintendent of the state hospital showing that he 
had been discharged from that institution. This point, how-
ever, was mentioned for the first time on the motion for 
a new trial. Although at the opening of the trial, Lind-
ley's counsel stated that he still doubted defendant's sanity, 
and he unsuccessfully moved the court to determine the 
question, no further objection was made then or at any 
time prior to the verdict and judgment. 
Section 1372 of the Penal Code reads: "If the defendant is 
received into the state hospital he must be detained there 
until he becomes sane. When he becomes sime, the superin-
tendent must certify that fact to the sheriff and district at-
torney of the county. The sheriff must thereupon, without 
delay, bring the defendant from the state hospital, and place 
him in proper custody until he is broug-ht to trial or judg-
ment, as the case may be, or is legally discharged." 
The Legislature has made no requirement that the certifi-
caation of sanity be in any particular form or that it be pro-
duced in court as a prerequisite to the right to proceed to trial. 
It is, as stated in People v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 147 
[47 P.2d 724], "at most, merely a formal statement made to 
the sheriff and district attorney that the defendant is not 
insane, and there is in fact no specific requirement that it be 
filed, nor does there appear to be great reason why it should 
be." In the case of Lindley, it appears that the sheriff re-
ceived a notice from the hospital, as did also the district at-
torney. There is nothing to indicate that a suffieient certifi-
eation of sanity was not duly made or that, if demanded,it 
could not have been produced. At the commencement of the 
) 
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trial the judge remarked in open court that "the man has been 
returned to this court as sane." The presumption, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, is that the duteis of the 
superintendent and other officials were properly performed. 
that the defendant was duly discharged from the hospital and 
that he was brought into court in the manner prescribed by 
statute. (Maloney v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 1 
[123 P.2d 449J; People v. Superior Court, supra; People v. 
McGee, 24 Cal.App.2d 391 [75 P.2d 533]; People v. Howard, 
134 Cal.App. 441 [25 P.2d 498].) 
[2] Section 1368 of the Penal Code provides: "If at any 
time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment 
a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court 
must order the question as to his sanity to be determined. . . ." 
The "doubt" mentioned is one that must arise in the mind 
of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the 
defendant or in that of any third person (People v. Perry, 
14 Cal.2d 387, 399 r94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 11231, and cases 
there cited) [3] and the determination of a motion for a 
hearing upon the issue of a defendant's sanity at the time 
of trial is one which rest!'1 within the sound discretion of the 
court. Necessarily, an appellate court cannot measure to a 
nicety the basi!'1 for the ruling, and the trial judge must al-
ways be allowed 8 wide latitude. (People v. Perry, supra, 
at pp. 397-399. and authorities there reviewed, 124 A.L.R. 
1123: People v. Cramer, 21 Ca1.2d 531 [133 P.2d 399]; People 
v. Croce. 208 Cal. 123, 131-134 [280 P. 526]; People v. 01.1-
berg, 197 Cal. 306. 311-312 [240 P. 1000]; People v. Keyes, 
178 Cal. 794, 801-802[175 P. 6]; People v. Fountain, 170 Cal. 
460,467 [150 P. 3411; People v. Hettick, 126 Cal. 425 [58 P. 
918]; People v. Geiger, 116 Cal. 440 [48 P. 389]; People v. 
Kirby, 15 Cal.App. 264, 269 [114 P. 794]; 8 Cal.Jur. § 270. 
p. 195; 4 Cal.Jur 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.) 721; 142 A.L.R. 
note, p. 961, at p 983.) Certainly there is nothing in the 
record of the present case indicating an abuse of discretion. 
On the contrary, it appears that the trial judge was well aware 
of his statutory duty. for in denying the motion for an inquiry 
into Lindley'S sanity at that time he ruled: "The question has 
once before been raised and the man has been returned to 
this Court as sane. The Court has no .other discretion but to 
proceed with the criminal case and if it should develop during 
the trial the Court may stop proceedings at any time." More-
/ 
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over, Lindley took the witness stand and gave perfectly lucid 
testimony in his own behalf and the reporter's transcript 
shows nothing which occurred during the course of the tria 1 
tending to raise any "doubt" whatever as to the defend-
ant's then sanity. 
[4] Concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict of the jury, the te...ntimony of the witnesses for the 
People shows no material inconsistencies or contradictions. 
All of them frankly admit to taking no account of time in 
their movements during the day. Every time estimate given 
was qualified as being only an approximation, yet much more 
than a thread of consistency runs through the evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution. AB the events of the day of Jackie's 
death were related to the jury, before reaching the boathouse 
"Red" had ample opportunity to attack the little girl and 
leave her unconscious at the point where she was found in 
response to her cries. Unquestionably this testimony and the 
physical facts are reasonably susceptible of the inference that 
Lindley went directly from the camp to the willows and was 
there when Jackie arrived five minutes later. The testimony 
of Main may have been induced by self-interest, and the sheep-
herder and Willa Mae were of dull mentality, but the ac-
counts given by Barbara and her father are full and clear, 
and each of their statements is consistent with the recital 
of events given by the other witnesses. 
There is nothing to indicate that there was any person in 
the vicinity of the boathouse other than those who were named 
by the witnesses, and Lindley is the only one described as 
being dressed in brown clothes and a brown hat. Also, one 
may conclude with more than reasonable certainty that he is 
the person to whom Jackie referred as "the red headed man 
at the boathouse." Moreover, Lindley was positively identi-
fied by the shepherd boy as the man whom he saw "fighting" 
with the little girl. He said: "They went down behind the 
willows . . . Red got up and then he started back to the boat-
house . . . I started off to the tomato patch. I got just around 
the curve and heard them yell and went back . . . the little 
girl was yelling for help ... I saw a man and lady come over 
the levee and take this little girl up towards the road." It 
was the duty of the jury to consider this evidence as against 
Lindley's categorical denial of guilt and his t.estimony that 
upon returning from the automobile trip, he walked down the 
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road directly to the boathouse. The weight to be accorded 
the statement of each of the witnesses was a question exclu-
sively for the determination of the jury and the verdict, which 
received judicial approval upon denial of the motion for a 
new trial, may not, therefore, be disturbed upon appeal 
(People v. Farrington, 213 Cal. 459, 463 [2 P.2d 814J ; People 
v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 278 [232 P. 710]). 
Lindley also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to 
establish murder of the first degree. There is no proof, 
whatever, he argues, of the commission of that crime. 
[5] SectioD 189 of the Penal Code defines as murder of 
the first degree, "all murder whieh is perpetrated by means 
of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is com-
mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, 
rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem .... " Where the mur- . 
der is committed in perpetration or attempted perpetration 
of any of the enumerated felonies, the offender "is guilty of 
murder of the first degree by the force of the- statute" 
(People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal.App.2d 52, 57 [87 P.2d 364]; 
see People v. Murphy, 1 Ca1.2d 37, 41 [32 P.2d 635]; People v. 
Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 AL.R. 1385J; 
People v. Sutton, 17 Cal.App.2d 561 [62 P.2d 397]). H the 
evidenee establishes conclusively that the murder was so com-
mitted, then only a verdict of murder of the first degree may 
properly be rendered. [6] And even where the showing is 
not conclusive, if the record affords substantial support for 
the conclusion that one of the enumerated felonies was per-
petrated or attempted, and the killing was committed in such 
perpetration or attempt, the judgment must be affirmed. 
(People v. Diaz, emte, p. 318 [158 P.2d 194]; P.ople v. 
Brown, 22 Cal.2d 752 [141 P.2d 1]; People v. Waller, 14 Cal. 
2d 693 [96 P.2d 344]; People v. Green, 13 Ca1.2d 37 [87 P.2d 
821]; People v. Martin, 12 Cal.2d 466 [85 P.2d 880]; PlOple 
v. Anderson, 1 Cal.2d 687 [37 P.2d 67]; People v. Miller, 
121 Cal. 343, 347 [53 P. 816]; People v. De La Roi, 36 Cal. 
App.2d 287· [97 P.2d 836]; People v. Meyers, 7 Cal.App.2d 
351 [46 P.2d 282].) [7] After conviction all intendments 
are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will nf\t be set 
aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no hypothesis 
whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support 
it. (People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714 [43 P.2d 260]; People 
v. Green, rupra; People T. De La Boi, IVPf'G.) 
/ 
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[8a] Lindley contends that here the evidence fails to suffi-
ciently establish either rape or attempted rape; that there is 
no proof of lying in wait, as distinguished from the mere fact 
that the murderer was concealed by the willows. (see People 
v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207; People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 891 
[156 P.2d 7]) ; and that there is no evidence that the killing 
was willful, deliberate, or premeditated. But unquestionably 
the jury reasonably could have drawn from the evidence the 
inference that the girl was killed in the perpetration or at· 
tempted perpetration of rape. When found, she was weak, 
choking, bruised. and close to death. Her clothing was torn . 
and she told those who came to her aid that she had:been . 
attacked by the "old red headed man" at the boathouse.: 
Wounds revealed by' the autopsy corroborated her charge;> 
[9] In establishing rape, evidence of any sexual penetra· 
tion, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. (Pen:r 
Code, § 263; People v. Howard, 143 Cal. 316 [76P. 1116]; 
PeopZe v. Britt, 62 Ca1.App. 674 [217 P. 767]; People v. 
Stangler, 18 Cal.2d 688 [117 P.2d 321].) [8b] Counsel 
argues that none of the abrasions caused bleeding and there 
was no proof as to when they might have been made. How-
ever, it was not essential to establish bleeding and an infer-
ence which could reasonably be drawn from th~ medical testi-
mony is that the abrasions were as newly inflicted as the throat 
marks. The girl's physical condition, and the marks on her 
body, coupled with all of the other evidence, amply support 
the conclusion that death resulted from injuries sustained 
either in a rape or an attempt to rape committed by Lindley. 
(People v. Dicz, lupra; People v. Brown, supra.) Under sueb 
circumstances, the absence of independent proof of premedi-
tation or deliberation is immaterial. The jury, one satisfied 
that a rape was perpetrated or attempted and that Lindley 
was the assailant, had no alternative but to return a verdiet 
of murder of the first degree.:>:: 
The last point presented concerns two instructions which, 
it is claimed, are erroneous. By them, counsel argues, I the 
jury was instructed that homicide by Lindley being proved. 
the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or that 
justified or excused it, then devolved upon him unless the 
proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show that the 
offense only amounted to manslaughter. Also, the argument 
continues, the jurors were told that if they found Lindley 
guilty of murder in the first degree, then in the absence of 
lOme extenuatiDr fact Of circumstance they should impose the ! 
) 
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extreme penalty of the law. By these instructions the jury 
had no alternative but to find Lindley guilty of mm-der in the 
first degree or of manslaughter or to acquit him. If they 
found him guilty of murder in the first degree, according to 
the instructions. the burden of proving facts and circum-
stances of mitigation or that justified or excused the homicide 
was upon Lindley and in the absence of such proof it was the 
duty of the jury to not relieve him from the' extreme penalty 
of the law. Moreover, it is contended, the jurors were not ade-
quately instructed as to the· difference between murder in 
the first degree and murder in the second degree. 
[10] The first of the challenged instructions is based upon 
section 1105 of the Penal Code. It reads: "Upon a trial for 
murder, the commission of the homicide by the defendant 
being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitiga-
tion or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon the defendant, 
unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show 
that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter or 
that the defendant was justifiable or excusable,· but the bur-
den of proof thus placed on the defendant is discharged and 
satisfied if it raises in your minds a reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt." Although the court added to the 
statute the italicized words correctly stating that a defendant 
is only required to produce enough evidence of the circum-
stances of the killing to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt 
(People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610 [76 P.2d 493) ; People v. 
Madison, 3 Ca1.2d 668 [46 P.2d 159]; People v. Post, 208 
Cal. 433 [281 P. 618]) the instruction should not have been 
given. However, the error, if it may be properly characterized 
as such, did not prejudice the rights of Lindley. Under the 
evidence the only crime of which he could have been found 
guilty was a killing in the perpetration or attempted perpe-
tration of rape, and the degree of that crime is fixed by statute. 
[11] By the second instruction relied upon as justifying a 
reversal of the judgment, the jurors were told that if they 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and 
also that there was some extenuating fact or circumstance in 
the case, it was within their discretion to specify a sentence 
which would relieve him from the extreme death penalty. But 
this discretion, said the court, "is not an arbitrary one, and 
is limited w determining which of two punishments shall be 
inflicted, and is to be employed only when the jury is satis-
lled that the lighter penalty should be imposed. If the evi-
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dence shows the defendant to bc guilty of murder in the first 
degree, but doe..<.; not show some extenuating fact or circum-
stance, it is the duty of the jury to find a simple verdict of 
murder in the first degree, and leave the law the responsibil. 
ity of affixing the punishment." In the recent case of People 
v. Kolez, 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580], this court adhered to 
a long line of decisions holding that the giving of such an 
instruction does not constitute error. 
[12] Nor is the appellant's complaint that the jury was 
not adequately informed concerning the difference between 
murder of the first and of the second degree well founded. 
By four instructions, the trial judge fully and correctly ex· 
plained the essential elements of each of these offenses. 
An examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, 
shows no error which has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
The evidence quite unerringly points to Lindley as the perpe-
trator of a revolting crime, and he had a fair and impartial 
trial fully protecting him in every substantial right. Mter less 
than two hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict 
requiring that a sentence of death be imposed upon him as 
punishment for his commission of murder of the first degree. 
The verdict is amply justified by the law and the evidence. 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are, 
and each of them is, affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgn1ent. The instruction 
in terms of Penal Code, section 1105, was erroneous for reasons 
set forth in People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 894-896 [156 
P.2d 7], and in my concurring opinion in People v. Albertson, 
23 Ca1.2d 550, 586·589 [145 P.2d 7]. It is doubtful whether 
such an instruction should be given even if accompanied by 
a proper explanation, but in any event the sentence that the 
court added in its instruction to the text of the section did 
not explain adequately the meaning of the section. I do not 
believe, however, that the error was prejudicial in this ease; 
it is improbable that a reasonable jury properly instructed 
would have rendered a different verdict. 
I believe that People v. Kolez, 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580], 
should be overruled for the reasons set forth in my dissenting 
opinion therein. Until it is, however, an instruction like 
the one there involved is not erroneous. 
